When mental states matter[1]

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In this paper I discuss a common ambiguity in the specification of the content of implicatures either in terms of mental states "$BEL_S(\psi)$" or in terms of simple propositions "ψ". The aim of this paper is to argue for a pluralistic view that acknowledges the coexistence of both specifications as distinct implicatures. As I argue, both specifications have different functions in communication, and there are conversational situations in which the speaker and hearer are motivated to rely on one or the other selectively. Moreover, I argue that taking the distinction between them seriously a) sheds new light on the debates between the Gricean approach to and the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures, and b) opens new questions regarding the (mutual) derivability of both specifications.

Key words: epistemic implicatures, Gricean pragmatics, scalar implicatures, co-ordination of actions, grammatical theory

1. Introduction

If we take a closer look at the literature on implicatures, we can notice a very common ambiguity in the way the content of implicatures is specified. On the one hand, implicatures are often specified as the contents of the beliefs (or other mental states) of a speaker (Blome-Tillmann; Davis).[2] On the other hand, implicatures are also specified as the

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2   See Blome-Tillmann (2013), Davis (2019).

beliefs (or other mental states) of a speaker herself (Geurts; Sauerland).[3] To mark the difference better, we can represent the first specification by a simple proposition, e.g. "ψ", and the second specification by a proposition with an epistemic operator, e.g. "$BEL_s(\psi)$" ("The speaker believes that ψ"). In what follows, I will call the former the content specification and the latter the epistemic specification of the content of implicatures or, for short, the content implicature and the epistemic implicature.

The ambiguity is so common in literature that we can even find papers in which both specifications are used equivocally. For example, when Carston (1998) gives examples of scalar implicatures, she uses both specifications:

(1) a. Bill has got some of Chomsky's papers.
     b. The speaker believes that Bill hasn't got all of Chomsky's papers.

(2) a. There will be five of us for dinner tonight.
     b. There won't be more than five of us for dinner tonight.[4]

In (1b), the implicature is specified as $BEL_s(\neg\psi)$, while in (2b), the implicature is specified as $\neg\psi$.

Another example can be found in Sauerland (2004). Sauerland paraphrases scalar implicatures as having the form "The speaker is certain that ψ is false" or $K\neg\psi$ (where the epistemic operator K approximates the knowledge, and so a mental state, of the speaker). But when he presents examples of scalar implicatures, he omits the epistemic operator and uses the content specification "ψ is false" or $\neg\psi$ only, without even noticing that there is any difference.[5] Similar examples are ubiquitous in the literature and authors often switch from one specification to another arbitrarily.[6]

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3 See Geurts (2010), Sauerland (2004).

4 Carston (1998, p. 179).

5 Sauerland (2004, p. 369).

6 A rare example of a paper that makes the distinction explicitly is Franke. Franke distinguishes between base-level implicatures ($\neg\psi$) and strong epistemic implicatures ($BEL_s(\neg\psi)$) and provides game-theoretic models for deriving both. Franke (2011).

The general aim of the paper is to argue for a pluralistic view of implicatures that recognizes the existence of the content specification and the epistemic specification as distinct types of implicatures. The particular aims of the paper are to argue that a) there is a substantial difference between epistemic and content specifications and the difference lies in the fact that the epistemic specification allows the hearer to manage expectations about the speaker's future actions, b) this difference allows us to recognize that different specifications have different functions in communication, and c) we can identify conversational situations that favor selective communication of either one or the other specification.

Furthermore, I argue that taking the distinction between epistemic and content implicatures seriously sheds new light on the current debate between the Gricean approach and the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures. Allowing for the pluralistic view makes us realize that the relationship between the two views is more complex than is usually assumed. As I argue, the two views provide two strategies for deriving scalar implicatures with different relative focus. From the perspective of the Gricean approach, the derivation of epistemic scalar implicatures is a prerequisite for the derivation of content scalar implicatures. From the perspective of the grammatical theory, the order of derivation is reversed: the derivation of content scalar implicatures is a prerequisite for the derivation of epistemic scalar implicatures.

In the paper, I will mostly rely on the examples of scalar implicatures, since they have probably attracted the most interest among researchers. However, there is nothing to prevent the main point of the paper from being generalized to other types of implicatures, and I use examples of other types of implicatures where appropriate.

In Section 2, I provide a historical background of how the ambiguity between epistemic and content specifications sneaked into pragmatics and discuss the reductive strategy for dealing with the ambiguity, according to which there are only epistemic implicatures. In Section 3, I show that there is a substantial difference between epistemic and content specifications in their effects on how the hearer can plan her future actions and manage her expectations about the speaker's future actions. In Section 4, I argue that the difference between the specifications

marks an important difference in their functions in communication, and I identify conversational situations that provide a prima facie reason to believe that both specifications can be communicated/derived selectively (i.e., without also communicating/deriving the other). In Section 5, I discuss the consequences of accepting the pluralistic view of implicatures for the current debates between the Gricean approach and the grammatical theory with a special focus on the (in)dependent derivability of both specifications in the case of scalar implicatures.

2. Grice and griceans on the specification of implicatures

Interestingly, the ambiguity between epistemic and content specifications can be traced back to Grice (1975). When he introduces and glosses his famous "garage" example, he states: "B would be infringing the maxim 'Be relevant' unless he thinks, or thinks it possible, that the garage is open, and has petrol to sell; so *he implicates that the garage is, or at least may be open.*"[7] In this quote, Grice seems to suggest that the content specification is the correct form of the content of implicatures. What is implicated is that the garage is/may be open, not that the speaker believes or knows that the garage is/may be open. However, just a few lines after this quote, Grice glosses over the exact same example in a slightly different way: "*The speaker implicates that which he must be assumed to believe* in order to preserve the assumption that he is observing the maxim Relation."[8] In this quote, Grice seems to suggest that what is implicated is the belief of the speaker that the garage is/may be open, thus indicating that the epistemic specification is the correct form of the content of implicatures.

   Historically, it was standard to use the content specification until Soames (1982) formulated what is now known as the "standard recipe" for deriving scalar implicatures:

> S has said ϕ.
> i. S could have made a stronger claim by saying ψ. Why didn't he do so?

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7 Grice (1975, p. 35, emphasis added).

8 Ibidem, emphasis added.

ii. Presumably, it's because S doesn't believe that ψ is true: ¬BEL$_S$(ψ).

iii. S has an opinion as to whether ψ is true: BEL$_S$(ψ) ∨ BEL$_S$(¬ψ).

iv. Between them, (ii) and (iii) entail BEL$_S$(¬ψ): S believes that ψ is false.[9]

For example, if ϕ = (3a), then we can use the standard recipe to derive (3b).

(3)   a. Sam ate some cookies.
        b. The speaker believes that Sam did not eat all the cookies.
        c. Sam did not eat all the cookies.

The reason why Soames (1982) started to use epistemic operators was that this allowed him to distinguish between the weak epistemic (ignorance) implicature ¬BEL$_S$(ψ) and the strong epistemic implicature BEL$_S$($\neg\psi$). But this step also has the effect that the epistemic operators used in the premises (*ii*) and (*iii*) are naturally carried over to the conclusion, resulting in the epistemic specification of the content of scalar implicatures. The standard recipe was subsequently adopted by many other researchers in the Gricean tradition (Horn; van Rooij and Schulz; Geurts)[10] and the use of the epistemic specification of implicatures became common.

However, the use of the content specification has not been completely abandoned, leading to the current state in which both specifications are often used interchangeably. Surprisingly, there is little or no reflection on this ambiguous use of the specifications and it seems that authors often consider them to represent one and the same thing. The question that arises is what this "same thing" is supposed to be.

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9   Geurts (2010, p. 32). See: Soames, S. (1982): "How presuppositions are inherited: A solution to the projection problém." *Linguistic Inquiry* 13 (3): 483–545.

10 See Horn (1989), van Rooij & Schulz (2004), Geurts (2010).

2.1 The reductive strategy for explaining the ambiguity

One way to explain away the ambiguity (and excuse the practice of using the specifications interchangeably) is to understand the use of the content specification as a pardonable simplification. The idea would be that, strictly speaking, the epistemic specification represents the only correct way to specify implicatures. The content specification is just a shorter, imprecise placeholder used for the sake of brevity.

Although this may not be explicitly acknowledged, I assume that some explanation along these lines is widely accepted in current pragmatics and philosophy of language. An example of someone who explicitly subscribes to the view that the content specification is just a placeholder for the epistemic specification is Levinson (2000).

> „Henceforth, I shall not in general mark the epistemic modification on implicatures: thus when I write "Some came" Q +> 'Not all came', this may be understood as a shorthand for 'the uttering of "Some came" will, ceteris paribus, implicate that the speaker judges that not all came' (where "judge" can be cashed out in various ways)."[11]

Levinson takes this view to be widely accepted within the Gricean tradition, and the reason he thinks this is so is the one given by Soames: without epistemic operators present in the specification of implicatures, we lose the distinction between weak and strong epistemic implicatures.[12]

At its core, this is a reductive strategy for explaining the ambiguity, because it basically reduces the content specification to the epistemic specification. According to this strategy, there are no content implicatures, there are only epistemic implicatures.

To be clear, I do not doubt that we need to make room for the distinction between weak and strong epistemic implicatures. But I also think that it is a bit too hasty to sacrifice content implicatures in order to do so.

The rest of the paper is a plea for a pluralistic account of implicatures. Following the Gricean tradition, I assume that the existence of epistemic

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11 Levinson (2000, p. 79).
12 Ibidem, 78.

implicatures is uncontroversial. However, I argue that we should also make room for content implicatures. To support the idea that there are content implicatures, I argue that a) there is a substantial difference between epistemic and content specifications, b) the specifications serve different functions in communication, and c) there are conversational situations that favor the selective communication and derivation of content specifications.

3. On the difference between epistemic and content implicatures

Before discussing the difference between epistemic and content specifications, I will make a small detour and discuss Grice's view of implicatures from a broader perspective. In dealing with the ambiguity, the reductive strategy assumes that only one specification of implicatures can be correct. Accepting this assumption, however, makes the Gricean tradition more Gricean than it needs to be.

Grice's view of implicatures[13] is built on his broader intentionalist view of communication[14]. According to the intentionalist view, communication in general is a matter of hearers' recognition of speakers' communicative intentions. Communication and the derivation of implicatures is just a specific case of the general intentionalist view: an implicature is something that the speaker intends to communicate by virtue of the hearer's recognition of that intention. In essence, the question of whether the speaker is implicating an epistemic or a content specification is not an issue about which Grice's account should make general a priori predictions. In other words, there is nothing un-Gricean about leaving open the possibility that speakers implicate one or the other according to their own preferences and the current conversational needs.

The question is whether there are in fact situations in which speakers are motivated to implicate one or the other, and hearers are motivated to derive one or the other selectively. In the remainder of this section I identify a substantial difference between epistemic and content specifications, and in the next section I argue that this difference provides

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13 Grice (1975, 1978, 1981).
14 Grice (1957, 1968, 1969).

a basis for explaining the motivation for selective communication of epistemic and content specifications.

The difference between the specifications lies in the fact that whether the hearer derives one or the other has profound consequences for how she can plan her subsequent actions. We can illustrate these consequences through the example of the sentence (4a).

(4)   a. Sam drank some beers.
             b. The speaker believes that Sam did not drink all the beers.
             c. Sam did not drink all the beers.

I focus first on a situation in which the epistemic specification (4b) is taken to be implicated. Let us say that two roommates are discussing what to put on a shopping list because one of them (Robin) is going to do the groceries:

Jesse: Are you sure you don't need help with the groceries?
Robin: Nah. I'm fine. It's just a few things.
Jesse: Oh, and what about beers? I heard you had a party here yesterday with your reading club. Did they drink a lot?
Robin: You know them. Sam drank some beers.

If Jesse (the hearer) derives (4b) as an implicature, the implicature carries information about the beliefs of Robin (the speaker), and this information has profound consequences for how Jesse can plan her subsequent actions. In particular, information about the speaker's beliefs allows the hearer to manage her expectations about the speaker's future actions and to plan her actions accordingly. If Robin believes that Sam did not drink all the beers, then she also probably thinks that it is not necessary to refill the fridge and so she will not include the beers in the shopping list. As a result, she will probably not buy any beers and so she will not have to carry the beers home.

This management of expectations about the speaker's future actions is made possible by information about the speaker's beliefs that is com-

municated as part of the epistemic specification (4b). Based on this management of expectations, the hearer can plan her actions accordingly. For example, Jesse may conclude that she really does not need to go with Robin to do the groceries, because Robin can easily carry the rest of the items on the shopping list by herself.

Let us now focus on a situation in which the content specification (4c) is taken to be implicated. Let us say that Jesse wants a beer and tries to find out whether they have any in the fridge:

> Jesse: Oh, I need a beer. I heard you had a party here yesterday with your reading club. Did they drink a lot?
> Robin: You know them. Sam drank some beers.

If Jesse (the hearer) derives (4c) as an implicature, the information carried by (4c) still has profound consequences for how she can plan her subsequent actions. In particular, Jesse may use the information that Sam did not drink all the beers to plan how to quench her thirst. Since Sam did not drink all the beers, there should be some beer in the fridge, so she does not have to go to the store. Or she may use this information as a reason to open the fridge door carefully so that the beer bottles do not fall out. Importantly, this planning on the part of the hearer is in no way dependent on the information about the speaker's mental states being available to the hearer.

The point I want to emphasize is that while both specifications can have an effect on how the hearer plans her future actions, there is a substantial difference between them in terms of what kind of effect they have. In contrast to the epistemic specification, the management of expectations about the speaker's future actions is not available if the hearer derives the content specification as an implicature. The lesson to be drawn from this example is that it matters whether implicatures are specified in their epistemic or content form and that the specifications should not be used interchangeably.

4. On the functions of epistemic and content implicatures

To sum up, the main difference between epistemic and content implicatures is that the former allows for the management of expectations about the speaker's future actions. My proposal is that this difference marks an important difference in their functions in communication. The function of epistemic implicatures is to facilitate the subsequent coordination of actions between the speaker and hearer. The function of content implicatures is to facilitate the hearer's self-concerning planning of actions. In this section I identify different conversational situations in which these different functions can be utilized. The aim of the section is to show that speakers and hearers are motivated to selectively communicate/derive both specifications of implicatures in different conversational situations.

In general, the epistemic specification is indispensable in those situations that require some subsequent coordination of actions between the speaker and hearer. In such situations, the speaker and hearer use information about each other's mental states to align their plans of actions accordingly. To put it bluntly, coordination of actions works well if the speaker and the hearer know what the other believes and wants.

In a scenario in which Robin and Jesse are making a decision about whether Jesse should help Robin with the groceries (i.e., they are coordinating their actions), both the speaker and the hearer are motivated to rely on the epistemic implicature (4b). If Robin knows that Jesse wants to help her with the groceries if they need to buy beer, then she, as the speaker, is motivated to communicate the epistemic implicature (4b). The reason for this is that the epistemic implicature informs Jesse about Robin's beliefs and thus helps Jesse to manage her expectations about Robin's future actions. And if Jesse wants to find out whether Robin wants/needs her help, then she is motivated to derive the epistemic implicature (4b) for exactly the same reason. The mere fact that the situation is such that some subsequent coordination of actions is required provides motivation for communicating and deriving the epistemic implicature.

However, conversational situations involving some subsequent coordination of actions are far from ubiquitous, and content implicatures

may be preferred in many other contexts. In general, content implicatures can be preferred in situations in which the hearer is engaged in self-concerning planning of actions. In such situations, information about the speaker's mental states has no direct consequences for the subsequent actions of the hearer and the management of expectations about the speaker's future actions does not play a role.

An example of such a situation may be one-off encounters. In such situations, the management of expectations about the speaker's future actions does not play a role because the prospect of coordinating future actions with the speaker is negligible. It seems prima facie plausible that in situations in which someone asks a stranger for a tip ("Some restaurants in the area are good") or for directions ("Some buses from this stop go to the city center"), the hearer is not motivated to derive information about the speaker's mental states and instead derives the content implicature. At the very least, the information provided by the content implicature is sufficient for the hearer to plan her own subsequent actions.

Similarly, if the speaker can communicate either the content implicature or the epistemic implicature, and only the hearer's self-concerning planning is at stake, the speaker has no motivation to communicate information about her mental states, since this information is irrelevant to the hearer. Communicating that not all buses from this stop go to the city center provides vital information to the hearer; communicating that the speaker holds this belief does not.

Interestingly, many of Grice's own examples of implicatures can be seen as falling under the bracket of self-concerning planning. Even Grice's (1975) notoriously famous "garage" example takes place in a conversational situation in which the speaker is a stranger giving advice to a driver standing next to an immobilized car. The stranger (the speaker) is supposed to communicate (5b) as an implicature by uttering (5a). The utterance of (5a) is supposed to be a direct response to the hearer's question whether there is a place nearby where she can get petrol.

(5)   a. There is a garage round the corner.
        b. The garage round the corner is open and selling
           petrol.

    c. The speaker believes that the garage round the
       corner is open and selling petrol.

In this scenario, there is no prospect of the future coordination of actions between the speaker and the hearer. The information provided to the hearer through the implicature (5b) only serves the purpose of helping the hearer to plan her own subsequent actions. In particular, she may use the information provided by (5b) to decide to go to the garage and buy some petrol. As long as only self-concerning planning is at stake, there is no need to communicate and derive information about the speaker's mental states, and thus doing so would be unmotivated for both the speaker and the hearer.

Let us now compare this scenario with a situation in which a driver and a passenger are sitting in an immobilized car and the passenger (the speaker) utters (5a) in response to the driver's query (6).

(6)   What shall we do?

The conversational situation is such that a subsequent coordination of actions is inevitable (this is actually what this conversation is about). This provides motivation for the speaker to communicate and for the hearer to derive (5c) as an implicature because the information provided by (5c) allows the hearer to form the expectation that the speaker will (most likely) go to the garage and try to buy some petrol.

4.1 No communicating without believing?

At this point, someone might object that, as per Moore's paradox, it is impossible to communicate a proposition without believing the proposition. The idea would be that the same sincerity condition (Searle; Ridge)[15] that normally applies to assertions also applies to the communication of implicatures. It would be incoherent for the speaker to intend to communicate "ψ, but I do not believe that ψ". If this is the case, so the argument goes, it seems impossible to communicate the content implicature without the epistemic implicature.

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15 Searle (1969), Ridge (2006).

However, I find this line of reasoning to be unsatisfactory. True, it would be incoherent to intend to communicate ψ as an implicature without believing that ψ. But this does not exclude the possibility that the speaker who believes that ψ intends to communicate ψ as an implicature selectively (that is, without communicating that she believes so). Similarly, the fact that it is safe for the hearer to attribute the belief that ψ to the speaker who communicates ψ as an implicature does not exclude the possibility that the hearer derives ψ as an implicature selectively. What Moore's paradox shows us is that the hearer *can* get the epistemic implicature "for free" every time the content implicature is intentionally communicated, not that she *must* derive the epistemic implicature in such cases.

In the situations that require only self-concerning planning, deriving the epistemic implicature from the content implicature would be a redundant, unmotivated step in pragmatic reasoning. Similarly, intending to communicate the epistemic implicature in such situations would mean intending to communicate redundant information to the hearer, and thus it would also be unmotivated on the speaker's side.

To sum up, in the previous section I argued that there is a substantial difference between epistemic and content implicatures. In this section, I argued that this difference marks an important difference in their functions in communication: epistemic implicatures facilitate the coordination of actions and content implicatures facilitate the hearer's self-concerning planning. The conversational situations discussed in this section are supposed to show that there are some specific contexts in which speakers are motivated to communicate and hearers are motivated to derive different specifications selectively.

5. On the consequences for pragmatics

Accepting that there is a substantial difference between epistemic and content implicatures may shed an interesting new light on recent debates on scalar implicatures. For several decades, the derivation of scalar implicatures has been predominantly explained in accordance with the Gricean tradition, i.e. in terms of hearer's reasoning about the mental

states of the speaker. The standard recipe is the prime example of such a derivation. But the hegemony of the Gricean approach has recently been undermined by the grammatical theory. Proponents of the grammatical theory (Chierchia; Fox)[16] postulate the presence of a silent operator in sentences that can be loosely glossed as "only" in English. The silent operator can be applied/blocked in different contexts and this influences the final interpretation of a sentence. For example, if the operator is applied to (7a), then the sentence is interpreted as (7b). The operator in such a case excludes the "some and possibly all" interpretation and this leads to the scalar implicature.

(7)   a. Some elephants are mammals.
          b. Only some elephants are mammals.

The grammatical theory was developed as an alternative to the Gricean approach, and the two views are often presented as rivals with respect to their ability to predict/explain scalar implicatures. The main advantage of the grammatical theory is that it can explain embedded implicatures, since the silent operator can be applied to any constituent of a sentence that has propositional content. However, in contrast to the Gricean approach, the grammatical theory has a problem in explaining ignorance implicatures.[17]

The two views are standardly taken to represent two different ways of deriving *exactly the same thing*, the scalar implicature, and discussion revolves around which view can do it better. However, if we admit that there is a substantial difference between epistemic and content implicatures, this forces us to rethink the relationship between the two view. Since the Gricean tradition understands the derivation of implicatures as reasoning about the mental states of the speaker, the product of the derivation is supposed to be an epistemic implicature. From the perspective of the grammatical theory, however, it is more natural to take the content implicature to be the product of the derivation.

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16 Chierchia (2006), Fox (2007).

17 But see Meyer (2013) for a proposal of how ignorance implicatures could be accommodated by the grammatical theory.

For the proponents of the grammatical theory, the derivation of sca-lar implicatures is supposed to be the result of a grammatical operation on the structure of a sentence. The grammatical operation consists basi-cally in the application of the silent operator at some point in a sentence. The scalar implicature is then just a logical consequence of the reinter-preted sentence. Since there is no reasoning about the mental states of the speaker involved in the derivation, there is no reason to assume that the resulting implicature contains an epistemic operator. The content implicature (8) is a logical consequence of (7b), which is the result of a grammatical modification of (7a).

(8) Not all elephants are mammals.

Neither of these steps assumes the presence of an epistemic operator. For this reason, the derivation of scalar implicatures from the perspec-tive of the grammatical theory (should be taken to) produce content im-plicatures.

As a result, it may be more productive to think of the Gricean approach and the grammatical theory as two proposals with different relative fo-cus: the Gricean approach focusing on epistemic scalar implicatures and the grammatical theory focusing on content scalar implicatures.

5.1 Interconnections

To say that the two views have different relative focus is not to say that the views (and their objects of study) are not interconnected. Although the Gricean approach provides a recipe for the derivation of epistemic implicatures and the grammatical theory provides a recipe for the derivation of content implicatures, both can be adapted in such a way that they can also explain the derivation of the other type of implicatures.

Starting with the Gricean approach, content implicatures can be de-rived by adding one more step to the standard recipe. This step is based on the assumption that it is safe to consider a proposition to be true if the speaker believes it to be true: $BEL_s(\neg\psi) \rightarrow \neg\psi$. The assumption is plausible under the condition that the speaker is justified in believing

the proposition and its plausibility increases even further if we follow Sauerland (2004)[18] and others and formulate the standard recipe in terms of knowledge rather than beliefs. In contexts in which it is safe to accept the assumption, hearers can use an extended version of the standard recipe to derive content implicatures:

> S has said ϕ.
> *i.* S could have made a stronger claim by saying ψ. Why didn't he do so?
> *ii.* Presumably, it's because S doesn't believe that ψ is true: $\neg BEL_S(\psi)$.
> *iii.* S has an opinion as to whether ψ is true: $BEL_S(\psi) \vee BEL_S(\neg\psi)$.
> *iv.* Between them, (*ii*) and (*iii*) entail $BEL_S(\neg\psi)$: S believes that ψ is false.
> *v.* S is justified in believing that ψ is false: $BEL_S(\neg\psi) \to \neg\psi$
> *vi.* ψ is false: $\neg\psi$ from (*iv*) and (*v*)

Starting with the grammatical theory, epistemic implicatures can be derived from content implicatures via the sincerity condition. The upshot of the discussion of Moore's paradox in Section 4.1 was that an epistemic implicature can be derived every time a content implicature is intentionally communicated. However, it was not clear whether there is a way to derive content implicatures in the first place. The grammatical theory provides a recipe for how this can be achieved.

If this is so, then it is not entirely wrong to say that the two views really explain the "same thing". But the more appropriate phrasing would be that they explain the same *things* and they differ in changing their order of explanation. In other words, they provide different strategies for deriving scalar implicatures. The Gricean approach favors the strategy according to which epistemic scalar implicatures are derived first and content scalar implicatures are derived subsequently. The grammatical theory favors the strategy according to which content scalar implicatures are derived first and epistemic scalar implicatures are derived subsequently.

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18 See Sauerland (2004).

Understanding the relationship between the Gricean approach and the grammatical theory in this way may prove very productive in opening new vistas of research in both theoretical and empirically oriented pragmatics.

First, identifying two separate ways of deriving epistemic and content implicatures opens up the possibility of having either an epistemic scalar implicature without the corresponding content scalar implicature, or vice versa. As a consequence, the question arises, for example, whether hearers can derive a content scalar implicature in situations in which the ignorance implicature is derived (and thus the epistemic scalar implicature is unavailable). Such a possibility should be impossible from the Gricean perspective, but it is perfectly viable if we allow for the pluralism of strategies for deriving scalar implicatures.

Second, recognizing that the two types of implicatures have different functions in communication leads to the prediction that the two strategies of deriving scalar implicatures could be used selectively in different conversational situations. This prediction opens up a number of new questions regarding the derivation of scalar implicatures, such as a) under what conditions exactly hearers tend to rely on one strategy rather than the other, b) whether they tend to stick to the strategy they started with when it is necessary to continue a derivation (and derive the other type of implicature), or c) whether they tend to abandon the strategy they started with and start the other strategy from scratch.

The definite answer to the question of whether hearers really use two strategies for deriving scalar implicatures is ultimately a matter of empirical research, and I have no ready-made answers to the questions of whether, and if so how exactly, the two strategies are interrelated. Rather, my aim is more modest. The point I want to emphasize is that such research questions are literally unavailable to us without taking seriously the difference between epistemic and content implicatures. For the time being, it would be enough to admit that there is an ambiguity in the specification of implicatures, and to try to eliminate it, as a first step in a good direction.

6. Conclusions

Contrary to the common practice of using the epistemic and content specifications of implicatures interchangeably, I argue for the pluralistic view according to which there is a substantial difference between the specifications. As I argue, the two specifications should be recognized as distinct implicatures because they have different consequences for the hearer and fulfill different functions in communication. Whereas epistemic implicatures allow the hearer to manage her expectations about the speaker's future actions, this management of expectations is not available in the case of content implicatures. This difference marks an important difference in the function of epistemic and content implicatures in communication. Whereas the function of the former is to facilitate coordination of actions, the function of the latter is to facilitate the hearer's self-concerning planning.

To the extent that only self-concerning planning is at stake in a conversational situation, communicating and deriving information about the speaker's mental states through an epistemic implicature is unnecessary and thus unmotivated for both the speaker and the hearer. For this reason, situations such as one-off encounters provide a context that motivates the selective communication/derivation of content implicatures.

As I argue further, allowing for the pluralistic view of implicatures, according to which epistemic and content specifications represent distinct implicatures, sheds new light on the current discussions between the Gricean approach and the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures. Allowing for the pluralistic view allows us to recognize that the two views provide different strategies for deriving scalar implicatures with different relative focus: the Gricean approach takes epistemic scalar implicatures as a prerequisite for deriving content scalar implicatures while the grammatical theory reverses their order of explanation. Identifying the two views as providing two different strategies for the derivation of scalar implicatures has the positive effect of opening up new ways of assessing their empirical plausibility and thus of opening up new vistas of research in pragmatics.

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Abstract

Kdy záleží na mentálních stavech

V tomto článku se zabývám běžnou nejednoznačností při specifikaci obsahu implikatur buď v termínech mentálních stavů „BELS(ψ)", nebo v termínech jedno-

duchých propozic „ψ". Cílem tohoto článku je obhájit pluralistický pohled, který uznává koexistenci obou specifikací jako odlišných implikatur. Jak tvrdím, obě specifikace mají v komunikaci různé funkce a existují konverzační situace, v nichž jsou mluvčí i posluchač motivováni spoléhat se selektivně na jednu nebo druhou. Navíc tvrdím, že vážné přijetí rozdílu mezi nimi a) vrhá nové světlo na debaty mezi griceovským přístupem ke skalárním implikaturám a gramatickou teorií těchto implikatur a b) otevírá nové otázky týkající se (vzájemné) odvozenosti obou specifikací.

Klíčová slova: epistemické implikatury, griceovská pragmatika, skalární implikatury, koordinace jednání, gramatická teorie.