

# HUNGARIAN DIPLOMACY TOWARDS AFRICA: FORGING BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE 1960s AND 1970s

Dániel Solymári<sup>a</sup> and István Tarrósy<sup>b</sup>

**Abstract:** One of the defining facts of Hungary's foreign policy is that it had political sovereignty only for short periods until 1989. At the beginning of the 1960s a pragmatic and constructive Hungarian foreign policy began to take shape, which, in the period of the détente within the Soviet Bloc, could follow a relatively independent path. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was one of its key relations, and it became one of the priority foreign policy directions of Hungarian diplomacy. The diplomatic steps taken towards SSA, and the formation of the Hungarian Africa policy during the détente period, we argue, offer relevant considerations from a pragmatic international relations perspective even today. Based on archival and printed press sources, the article provides an analysis of Hungary's "African turn" between 1960 and 1970.

**Keywords:** *Hungarian foreign relations, Cold War, détente, Sub-Saharan Africa, Red Africa, Southern Opening*

## Introduction

The present article offers an in-depth historiographical analysis of Hungarian foreign policy towards Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. In order to understand on what grounds and for what reasons today's Hungary fosters re-engagements with African countries, we provide the context of the formulation of the country's first Africa policy during the Cold War. The article begins by drawing a broad picture about the context of limitations before the 1960s, then describes how Hungary led the way in improving trade, economic and diplomatic relations with numerous partners across the African continent. Following this, we look at Hungary's special place

---

a Interdisciplinary Doctoral School, Political Science Programme, University of Pécs, Hungary and Royal Geographical Society, UK, e-mail: solymari.daniel@maltai.hu

b Department of Political Science and International Studies and Africa Research Centre, University of Pécs, Hungary, e-mail: tarrosy.istvan@pte.hu.

and status in the Soviet Bloc before and after Stalin's death and the country's attempts to break out of the status quo of international isolation. As a next step, we discuss at length the government's achievements under János Kádár-led, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Hungary, practically Prime Minister between 1961-1965, in creating a new pragmatic, well-thought-out first foreign policy in Africa. Finally, we explore several cases of pioneering Africa-related diplomatic efforts.

During the 1950s and 1960s, a peculiar geopolitical situation had arisen in Hungary, one of the satellite states of the USSR. In its foreign affairs, a gap had opened up, a tangible diplomatic window for which there had not been an example for several centuries. Until the end of the so-called "Hungarian question" at the United Nations (in which the UN investigated the events of the Budapest Revolution in 1956), the country lived in international isolation and diplomatic quarantine: it could hardly open embassies and its foreign relations were reduced to a minimum. The issue remained on the agenda of the UN General Assembly until December 1962 and was only closed in 1963. Thereafter, Hungary's primary aim was to gradually get off the international community's blacklisting: to expand its embassy network, re-establish bilateral agreements, and move around the world as a member of the international community (Békés 2022: 259-274). Hungary also had the intention to enhance its economic power and independent leeway in the geopolitical space. Therefore, in the post-1956 period, Hungarian geopolitics could be objectively characterised as "languishing in fetters": with its feet and hands bound, wishing to move freely, and come to agreements as a political formation. Following the "Year of Africa" in 1960, when 17 formerly colonised countries gained their independence, at the same time but independently of events in Africa, Moscow fell into an open confrontation with China, its primary and most important ideological follower. As a result of these events, Hungary felt obliged to give China the cold shoulder, even though earlier on the Chinese government had supported János Kádár in his consolidation attempts (Vámos 2017: 47-75). In this altered, special geopolitical situation, leading Hungarian politicians arrived at a pragmatic decision: they turned towards Africa, a move that Moscow not merely endured, but rather positively supported.

In the present article, we review the political-historical developments that led to the opening of Hungarian diplomacy towards Africa after 1960. We use different archival documents to present the foundations of Hungarian relations with Africa in the *détente* era ("relaxation," the period of 1960-1980 during the Cold War), with the aim of stimulating further, more detailed research. The aim of the study is not to examine a specific direction

or country-relation in detail, but rather to provide an analytical overview. This research is new and filling a gap as Hungarian-African relations after 1960 have scarcely been researched in detail.

## **Methodology and Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical analytical approach of this research was developed by considering three basic, interacting geopolitical pillars: (1) the Western or capitalist value and political system dominated by the United States on one side of the bipolar world order, (2) the undemocratic, socialist Eastern Bloc dominated by the Soviet Union, which in many respect was quite different from it, and (3) the emerging independent third world or developing countries, including the new African state formations with both Western and socialist values. The research was carried out in a complex theoretical framework including political realism with a focus on the realities of power politics as the ultimate goal in the international system (Carr 1939). Also, structural realism was offering here the ground not only to shed light on the foreign policies of states, but also on the international system as such (Waltz 1995: 67-83). In connection with this paper, structural realism has a particular relevance, as John Mearsheimer found, nations should pursue their own and ideological interests, asserting their own interests regardless of the international environment (Mearsheimer 2019). Ideological cooperation, in line with Soviet foreign policy during the *détente*, the time of late Cold War, was strongly associated with cooperation and national parochialism as pragmatic “state” interests. The emphasis on the specificities of these three pillars is particularly important for our article, since the expansion of the foreign policy of the Hungarian People’s Republic and the increase of its diplomatic room for manoeuvre can only be interpreted correctly in the context of the specificities and events of the bipolar world order.

This article is based on archival sources, mostly from the National Archives of Hungary (MNL) and the Miklós Bánffy Specialised Library of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (KKM BMSZ). The importance of the archival material lies in the fact that, from 1989 onwards, a huge amount of previously classified primary sources became available, for which (apart from a few examples already mentioned) relatively scarce research had been done on African relations. Secondary research and a critical review of the associated classical and contemporary literature was complemented by an examination of the Hungarian print press of the period, which was made possible by the now abundant, almost complete online databases of daily and weekly newspapers.

## **Timeframe of the Present Study**

The research topic is situated in the international system of the bipolar world after 1945, in the political era of the *détente*. The period is also known collectively as the Cold War or the Cold War era. There is relatively broad agreement on the timing of the Cold War, including the fact that it is not possible to pinpoint its starting point with absolute precision. In contrast to the Second World War, the beginning of which can be treated as a historical fact, the Cold War did not break out but emerged as a result of a complex process. The primary dynamic of the period and the core of events was the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union by 1945. According to Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen M. Waltz, the chronology of the Cold War can be most accurately defined as two intervals: its initial development between 1945 and 1947 and its full duration between 1947 and 1991 (Morgenthau 2013: 198-210). The entire period can be defined as the period between the end of the Second World War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact. This is perhaps the most generally and widely accepted classical view. It is important, however, to place the European political events following the Second World War in the context of the movements that were then gaining strength in sub-Saharan countries. This was emphasised, among others, by the Africanists Radoslav A. Yordanov and Robert G. Patman when they focused on African relations in the period between 1950 and 1960 (Yordanov 2016). In assessing the Cold War, Patman analyses that special attention should be paid to the African countries that became independent in the 1960s and sought to move on not towards the capitalist West but towards the countries of the Soviet bloc. Many of these African countries wanted to join the world defined by the Soviet Union rather than the United States, a political motivation that led to real and, in many cases, mutually beneficial peaceful cooperation (Patman 1990: 35).

To sum up, in post-1956 Hungary, an outward-looking and active foreign policy began, mainly in the early 1960s, and more intensively after Leonid Brezhnev's election as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1964. The conclusion of the UN's "Hungarian question" in 1963 and the independence of African countries from 1960 created the conditions for a normalisation of bilateral relations with individual countries and a proactive opening towards the developing world.

## **An Inescapable Path: Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Soviet Bloc**

Our investigation begins in 1944–1945, after the communist takeover, when the country's foreign policy was fundamentally transformed. Hungary became part of the Soviet sphere of influence, sinking to the level of a Soviet satellite. At the inaugural meeting of the Cominform (Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties) in 1947, Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov outlined the dual worldview of power in the international system: an aggressive, warmongering imperialist bloc vis-à-vis a peaceful, democratic, socialist bloc (Anonymous 1953; Délmagyarország 1953: 1-2). Hungary was Sovietised at a stormy pace: the parliamentary system as well as the multi-party system ceased, a one-party-based administration was established, and the diplomatic space was clearly closed. Joseph Stalin (General Secretary of the Communist Party from 1922 to 1952 and Chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1941 until 1953) became the ultimate leader of foreign policy, controlling each secretary general of satellite country's state-parties through the foreign affairs department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow. In Hungary, Mátyás Rákosi, Secretary-General, later Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Hungary, adopted "the Soviet form of proletarian dictatorship" (Borhi 2004: 131). Ernő Gerő, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic between 1953 and 1955 and Minister of Interior until 1954, and Rákosi's right-hand man, managed "Hungarian foreign policy." However, the leaders of the Hungarian communist country did not have their discretion: there was no ministry for foreign affairs, no foreign service, no diplomacy, the leaders were only executing the orders coming from Moscow. There was no "independent national foreign policy in the traditional sense, as the country's subordination to the Soviet empire was the prime determinant of its foreign policy" (Békés 2011: 65-97). The system and network of Stalinism provided the international framework of reference in terms of foreign affairs: the Hungarian–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (1948), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and the so-called "collective defence treaty" of European socialist countries, the Warsaw Pact (1955).

The events of the Cold War narrowed down the diplomatic leeway for Hungary even more: the possibility of travelling abroad was eliminated or reduced to a minimum (it was difficult or impossible to obtain a passport enabling travel to the West), sending letters was also limited; the country's foreign relations became hostile and conflicted with countries beyond the "Iron Curtain." Embassies, diplomatic missions in the West only had formal functions, if any. Nonetheless, certain foreign economic relations intensified by the 1950s:

Hungarian foreign policy, which turned primarily to the East, sought new partners and bilateral agreements. The period can be considered a new opening, one of the most significant diplomatic steps of which was Hungary recognising (among the first few countries) the People's Republic of China and reopening its embassy in Beijing in 1949. However, a turn towards Africa could not yet begin as Stalin refused to recognise the newly independent colonial countries. Following Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet foreign policy sought opportunities for easing tensions: Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, later the President of the Council of Ministers, who saw an opportunity in cooperating with the Third World and tried to support the Non-Aligned Movement, which presented not only ideological grounds, but also pragmatism in the development of relations. After a short period of "diplomatic quarantine," following the events of the revolution in Budapest in 1956, Hungarian travel restrictions were eased in the 1960s: visa-free travel was allowed within the socialist bloc and official travels abroad were also easier (MNL2 3115/1957). At first, most Western countries considered the Hungarian government led by János Kádár to be illegitimate, and later "only" uncomfortable, thus diplomatic relations were kept to a minimum. Therefore, Moscow became interested in compensating elsewhere and looked for international recognition, foreign economic connections, and ideological allies in other directions. The first significant attempts to break out, no longer exclusively in Europe, took place in the early 1960s: nearly 90 new diplomatic missions were established even on ambassadorial levels in African, Asian, Middle East, and Latin American countries.

### **Developing Foreign Policy in the Kádár Era towards the Third World**

A more dynamic period of Hungarian foreign policy concerning the African continent began in the 1960s. Prior to that, with Stalin's death in 1953, a more open, rational Soviet foreign policy mindset emerged. His successor, Khrushchev, urged secession from Stalinism; his policy meant relief, breaking out of isolation, and more open diplomacy towards the world. Thus, new connections were established in the socialist relation, but trust had to be earned first. Clearly, we could see "an abandonment of the Zhdanov doctrine for a more global approach."<sup>1</sup> With the stabilisation of

1 The Zhdanov Doctrine was a Soviet cultural doctrine developed by Central Committee secretary Andrei Zhdanov in 1946. It aimed to establish a clear ideological divide between the communist and capitalist worlds, positioning the USSR as the leader of an anti-imperialist, democratic camp against Western imperialism. Its purpose was to enforce strict cultural and political conformity within Soviet and allied states.

the situation in the Europe from the early 1960s, the Soviet Union and the countries of the Eastern Bloc could turn their attention to other regions as well” (Békés et al. 2015).

Building trust was not easy for Hungary, ruled by Mátyás Rákosi, in constant confrontation with the West. Bilateral cooperation was one-dimensional, the country was economically exhausted, Western diplomatic relations became hostile, mutual expulsions became regular, and relations with the West froze in general. In 1949, the country’s membership in the UN failed, and it also reduced its involvement in international organisations in which Western states were members (e.g., it withdrew from the World Health Organization in 1950). After the defeat of the 1956 Budapest revolution, and the retaliation, the Soviet influence did not cease. However, with the new socialist leadership by János Kádár, easing also began in Hungarian politics: a soft dictatorship, the so-called “goulash communism,” gradually unfolded itself, and a period of relative prosperity began. In a matter of years, Hungarian foreign policy was transformed, as the only rational course of action (Ignáth 2010: 200). In 1956, Kádár became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People’s Republic (practically the head of government). For Khrushchev, he became a good disciple, and Hungary became a vanguard in the Bloc. Róbert Szabó Győri put it this way: “Between 1957 and 1964, the Khrushchev-led Soviet Union pursued a dynamic, proactive, self-confident foreign policy. [...] It became more cooperative and flexible with its allies, alleviating the complete subordination of its subject states” (Győri Szabó 2011: 270). In Hungary, power was held by the state party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP).

In foreign affairs, the Political Committee of the HSWP made decisions, which were prepared by the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee, for which the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was responsible. Kádár was open for and interested in international affairs and pursued a pragmatic foreign policy from as early as the beginning of the 1960s. He believed in the struggle between the Western capitalist and the socialist world orders, but wanted to create his new political and economic system in a negotiated, constructive way. Among the principles of the foreign policy he outlined at the Ninth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) in 1966 in Budapest we find: the development of economic and cultural connections, supporting the independence movements of the Third World, and cooperation with the newly decolonised states (Anonymous 1967; Magyar Tudomány 1967: 3). Frigyes Puja, who was Foreign Minister for almost ten years, summarised the essence of proletarian internationalism:



“the principle of the foreign policy of the Hungarian People’s Republic is the principle of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems; an interstate relationship in which the parties renounce war, respect each other’s sovereignty and consider this as a general norm in their bilateral relations” (Puja 1981: 55). The foreign policy of the Kádár regime no longer reflected the retaliatory, unyielding worldview of Rákosi’s Hungary between 1940–45 (Balogh 1982: 68). The weight of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased and trained professionals such as the former Reformed Bishop, politician János Péter, the former Piarist student, lawyer, career diplomat (and Africanist) Endre Sík, or Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja, who led the ministry for ten years, joined the administration. As a trained Africanist, with a degree from Moscow and a doctorate from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest, Endre Sík served as deputy foreign minister (from 1954), then, as first deputy of the foreign minister (1954–1957), finally, as the country’s foreign minister (in 1958), “at a time when the ‘Hungarian question’ was highly controversial at the UN and other international gatherings” (Búr 2007: 164).

Sík’s familiarity with African history and peoples surely gave him an advantage in the government’s negotiations with their African counterparts. Budapest took the first steps to establish bilateral relations with Africa, especially with Ethiopia, which was visited by Foreign Minister Endre Sík in December 1959. Sík’s visit to East Africa was the first significant Hungarian state visit and created opportunities for the entire Hungarian diplomatic corps to show a deeper commitment to the continent. This visit also boosted the commitment of the Hungarian socialist state administration, and Sík, armed with personal experience, represented the new foreign policy direction in Hungarian political decision-making bodies. The 1959 trip proved to be a momentous one, followed by others, and it laid the foundations for all of them.

### **Hungary–Africa Relations in the Socialist Era**

In his speech at the 1967 Conference of the HSWP, Kádár described the development of foreign relations with African (as well as Asian and Latin American) countries as a primary goal: in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, “we develop our cooperation with independent states in Africa, we strive for peaceful coexistence,” he claimed. However, behind this explicitly open-minded, proactive foreign policy stood partly political pragmatism and partly the political ideology of the Communist Bloc (Puja 1981: 5). Historically, there had been a “co-evolution” of events: many of



the newly independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa had at the same time sought to begin on their path of independence and began to build up their economic and administrative frameworks. Some independent African countries were open to socialist ideas and accepted the (predominantly ideological) help offered by the Communist Bloc countries. As Fage and Tordoff wrote: “In the independent countries, there was a rapid shift from pluralism to the centralisation of power (power was usually concentrated in the hands of a single party) and a kind of socialist approach. However, only eight African countries have officially announced a socialist government program. By the 1970s, only a handful of African leaders identified with orthodox Marxist views. Instead, most of them adapted Marxism and other ideas to the African conditions. The ‘socialist umbrella’ in Africa was so broad that even the Kenyan and Senegalese leaders who pursued capitalist-type policies could fit in under it” (Fage and Tordoff 2022: 154). A kind of unique “African socialism” (as Léopold Sédar Senghor called it) was born, fusing anti-communism, pragmatic cooperation with the West, and the conscious incorporation of private capital.

Kádár, whose programmatic speeches at the Congresses of the HSWP showed a clear plan for his foreign policy’s directions, tried to canalise his foreign policy into this trend (Békés 2019: 11). We can learn more about this train of thought in detail through the books of Frigyes Puja, Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1973 and 1983, “Unity and Debate in the International Communist Movement” published in 1969, and “Hungarian Foreign Policy” published in 1980. “Proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence” were the primary principles of Kádár’s diplomacy. Kádár saw a force in the socialist world that could serve as a tool for the former colonial countries with a socialist orientation to build their state (Puja 1981: 50). He supported “the struggle of national liberation movements against old and new colonisation, imperialist oppression [and] sought to develop its cooperation with the independent countries of Africa” (Ibid. 62). Linked to the Chinese and Cuban processes, initially indirectly, Kádár also sought to help this “fight” in South Africa, Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique. The relation between Hungary and developing countries, including sub-Saharan Africa, was seen by Kádár as areas of potential partnership, and possibly a new strategic direction for Hungarian diplomacy. Moreover, he especially saw the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, primarily East Africa and the former Portuguese colonies, as key figures in the international class struggle, natural allies in the fight against imperialism and neo-colonialism. In this approach, Kádár began to take his first, independent diplomatic steps in the 1950s.

## The Kádár Era's first Africa Connections

The revolutionary events in Budapest significantly influenced developments in 1956, which indirectly contributed to Hungarian foreign policy directions between 1956 and 1960–1961. The diplomatic goal of the Kádár administration was to have Hungarian foreign policy recognised in the international arena, break with the isolated, pariah state of the 1950s (and before), and develop its economic relations. János Kádár wanted to achieve all this with pragmatic, well-thought-out foreign policy instruments. He sought to settle this struggle peacefully, in political, economic, and ideological competition. In terms of ideology, he believed in socialism's supremacy, saw a balance of power in the politico-military field, and perceived significant backwardness only in economic terms, so he tried to focus on this area. In order to implement this plan, the first (or somewhat revitalised) symbolic steps took place in 1956 and 1957 with Egypt and Sudan, and later with other sub-Saharan African countries (MNL5 3002/1956).

In August 1957, a government delegation travelled to Egypt under Károly Szarka, Deputy Foreign Minister (and UN Ambassador in 1972). The primary purpose of Szarka's visit, which took place before the UN autumn session, was to gain support for the Hungarian delegation in the debate on the "Hungarian question" (Király 2006: 37). In April that year (as a prelude to the mission), Foreign Minister Imre Horváth (former Ambassador in Berlin, London, and Prague, leader of the second Hungarian UN delegation in 1957) submitted a motion to the Council of Ministers (the government) to start negotiations on promoting the consulate in Cairo to the rank of an embassy. The proposal read: "In order to deepen the friendly relations established between the two countries, it is necessary to raise our consulates to the rank of embassies vis-à-vis" (Gazette Hungary 1957: 389). This idea was on the table before 23 October 1956, but could not be discussed due to the Hungarian revolution that took place (MNL3 3175/1957). The (first) Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government led by Kádár finally decided in 1957 to raise the consulate (reopened in 1947) to the rank of an embassy and the delegation led by Szarka started negotiations in Egypt (MNL3 3175/1957). On 29 August 1957, President Gamal Abdel Nasser received the Hungarian delegation at his apartment, and they discussed the situation of the UN and the Fifth Committee, in particular. According to the meeting notes, Nasser said that: "Western powers use the Hungarian problem for propaganda at the UN, primarily against the Soviet Union. He stated that the support of Egypt and Syria is granted" (J. Nagy 2017a: 61). The mission was successful in this respect: in the next

five years, while the UN was investigating the “Hungarian Problem,” Egypt and the Arab countries voted in favour of the Hungarian government. A reciprocal visit took place in the same year: an Egyptian parliamentary delegation visited Hungary, during which military, economic, cultural, and agricultural trade issues were on the agenda. The Hungarian press covered the event extensively, dailies reported about it in detail. They illustrated the visit of Abdel Fattah el Bindari, the Governor of Cairo, to the Budapest City Council and the trip of Minister of Transport Mustafa Khalil, who travelled from Hegyeshalom to Győr on a diesel train manufactured in Hungary, with photo reports. News about the “developing world” became recurring topics, the newspapers *Szabad Nép* (*Free People*), *Népszabadság* (*Liberty of People*), *Pesti Hírlap* (*Pest News*), *Esti Hírlap* (*Evening News*) all reported on domestic and international affairs of the Arab countries. Relations between the two countries (similar to the situation before 1945) were revitalised. Western diplomats, such as the French ambassador stationed in Budapest, reported on this “Eastern Opening” and “trade offensive” (J. Nagy 2017b: 341). Just a few examples of the revived cultural and economic collaborations:

- Egypt bought three million table tennis balls from the Toothbrush Factory in Mosonmagyaróvár, securing the year-round operation of the plant (Anonymous 1957a).
- The Vác and Ganz Shipyards manufactured 100-ton floating cranes for Egypt (Anonymous 1957b).
- The Ganz Shipyard produced special coco-fired boilers for Egypt (Anonymous 1957c)
- The Ikarusz bus company and MÖGÜRT Foreign Trade Company exported seventy trucks and dumpers
- The “expedition” of the Hungarian Museum of Natural History replaced the museum’s previously destroyed collection of animals containing reptiles, insects and birds from Egypt
- The Egyptian government ordered cattle for breeding from Hungary
- Gyula Germanus gave his inaugural speech at the Egyptian Academy of Sciences (Anonymous 1957d).

All these examples are excerpts of this prosperous bilateral relations between Hungary and Egypt, but also show the dynamics of the economic, sports, and scientific diplomacy of the era, outlined in a separate economic plan by the prominent politicians of the day (MNL4 3200/1957). After nearly

two years of preparation and diplomatic negotiations, Gamal Abdel Nasser finally visited Budapest on 29 April 1958, with other senior government politicians of the United Arab Republic, such as Vice President Abdel Latif Baghdadi or Mahmoud Fawzi, Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Hungarian press reported on the short visit on several front pages (Anonymous 1957e).

By the end of the 1950s, Hungary had become an active player in international diplomacy. By 1960, among other examples, the Japanese–Hungarian diplomatic relations were restored, and collaborations were established with the (neutral) countries of the European Free Trade Association. Hungary’s foreign policy with the Middle East and Latin America, as well as with the newly independent “developing countries” in the former African colonial territories, was vital and effective: by 1955, Hungary had established diplomatic relations with 36 states, and by 1958 with 39 states in the World (Györi Szabó 2011: 266). The weight of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased primarily due to the leading role of the career diplomat and scientist Endre Sik, and the fact that the foreign services became more and more professionalised.

### **Hungary’s African Relations after 1960**

In October 1960, János Kádár travelled to New York, where he continued to try and win over the UN General Assembly in connection with the revolution of 1956. By this time, the interest in Hungarian affairs of the international community had waned. In 1961, John F. Kennedy became President of the United States, representing a more cooperative policy towards the Soviet Union (thus also with Hungary) and supporting the removal of the “Hungarian question” from the UN’s agenda. In 1962, the Hungarian–American relation seemed to be settled, and by 1963, at the initiative of the United States, the UN had closed the Hungarian case, and the UN Special Committee ceased its operations (Király 2006: 40). Subsequently, the Hungarian government’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy expanded significantly and the second significant period of Hungarian–African relations began in 1963 (Kecskés 2018: 261).

The Hungarian government embarked on a more proactive and open foreign policy than before. The general rules of travel were “relaxed”: it was possible to travel visa-free with a red passport within the socialist bloc (except the Soviet Union), while for voyages to the West a blue passport was issued once every three years with the possibility to exchange a limited amount of currency

(MNL1 3241/1956). However, travelling to Western countries still required a visa. The entry rules were also relaxed: from 1964, all Hungarian embassies could issue visas to Hungary. Even more travel restrictions were lifted for Hungarian citizens beginning with the 1970s (Bencsik 2002: 31-50). The foreign affairs apparatus and administration were transformed, and diplomats' training was developed and expanded. Hungarian–African relations became more vital than before. In the following we shall present in more detail the state visits that have fundamentally shaped Hungarian-African relations since 1960. These trips have been selected with the aim of highlighting the foreign policy moves and mindset that shaped bilateral relations the most.

### **The Tour of the Kállai Delegation in 1962**

In 1960, the Hungarian government, led by Ferenc Münnich, appointed a government envoy to attend the ceremony of Somalia's declaration of independence, and at the same time decided to recognise the country and establish diplomatic relations. Similarly, Hungary recognised the Federation of Mali, Malgas, Ghana, Togo, Mali, and the Republic of Senegal. A decision was made to train Algerian workers invited by the National Council of Trade Union (SZOT) and to set up a joint committee with the United Arab Republic (Anonymous 1931 in *Pesti Napló* 82). In connection with the latter, the Hungarian government concluded a loan agreement in 1962 to purchase Hungarian technology. In the same year, an educational, scientific, and cultural agreement was concluded with the Republic of Ghana and the country's president was invited to Budapest. Although these can be considered small steps in the bilateral diplomatic relations with countries of Africa, they were preliminaries to the complex decision made in 1962, which provided for the political, economic, cultural, and information objectives of the Hungarian People's Republic in sub-Saharan Africa. This decision no longer addressed African issues on a case-by-case basis but set out comprehensive guidelines. It clarified that "in accordance with our capabilities and opportunities, we must gradually increase our involvement in helping the countries of sub-Saharan Africa" (MNL6 3177/1962). It laid down plans for sending delegations to Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tanganyika. It set forth the objective to conclude a "commercial payment, credit, technical assistance and cultural contract" with the Republic of Mali and set up a trade office in Ethiopia (MNL7 3340/1962). The comprehensive resolution signed by János Kádár on 14 June 1962 is one of the most important documents of the era for our topic. The significance

of the document is that it was the first governmental decision, following a couple of lower precedents, to transform the relatively ad hoc relations into a policy level decision. The policy level created a new direction in the attitude of the entire Hungarian administration, which now had full governmental authority (Solymári 2023: 283-303).

One of the most significant results of the era in terms of African relations were connected to the tour of the delegation led by Gyula Kállai in 1962. This visit was not an isolated event but the consequence of a constructive opening process. The Hungarian government decided to send a high-level government delegation to West and North Africa, led by Gyula Kállai, Vice-President of the Revolutionary Workers'-Peasants' Government. The delegation travelled to Africa on 1 December 1962. In addition to ambassadors and institute leaders, the members were Jenő Incze, Minister of Foreign Trade; Károly Szarka, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; and János Molnár, Deputy Minister of Culture. The delegation visited seven African countries: Guinea, Mali, Dahomey, Ghana, Nigeria, Algeria, and Morocco, participated in high-level meetings, and concluded numerous agreements. The Hungarian press reported about the tour on an almost daily basis (e.g. *Esti Hírlap*) and, upon their return, the delegation compiled a detailed package of proposals for the government. As a result of the agreements of Gyula Kállai, the government approved the following proposals in its resolutions of 29 August 1963:

- On sending building materials and specialists to Guinea and Ghana
- On the deployment of water management technology in the Republic of Mali and Ghana
- On the economic and credit agreement to be concluded with Algeria
- On setting up African joint ventures
- On entering into international organisations with a strong presence in less developed countries
- On accelerated training for professionals speaking the languages of African countries
- On lobbying in multilateral organisations for the support of experts to be sent to African countries
- On sending experts from the TESCO Foreign Trade Company to African countries<sup>2</sup>

---

2 TESCO (International Technical and Scientific Cooperation and Trading Office) was the agency for managing technical-scientific cooperation, established by the Hungarian government in 1962.

- On offering 137 scholarship places to African countries for the 1963/64 academic year (and increasing this number following the construction of new student hostels from 1964/65)
- On the establishment of an English-language group of students at the Medical University of Pécs
- On the registration of persons who can be sent to Africa for university and college teaching
- On the English-language sports coach programme at the College of Physical Education for Guinean students
- On launching the international relations degree programme at the Károly Marx University of Economics in Budapest and hosting scholarship holders
- On introducing African cultural products to the Hungarian public
- On establishing a Department of African Studies at the Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös Lóránd University in Budapest
- On preparing the establishment of the African Scientific Institute, with the involvement of the African-Asian Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences on the development of a research program
- On scientific publishing and the sending of books with the involvement of the Institute of Cultural Relations of Hungary
- On sending music teachers to Ghana and hosting African cultural professionals
- On establishing embassies in Nigeria and the Republic of Dahomey
- On János Kádár's invitation of the President of the Republic of Guinea.

Gyula Kállai extended the invitation of his government to the presidents of the host African countries, including Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella; President Hubert Maga of Dahomey; President Sékou Ahmad Touré of Guinea; Modibo Keita, the first President of Mali; and the heads of Moroccan and Nigerian delegations. Students from brotherly African countries receiving government scholarships from Hungary began their studies at Hungarian universities in 1963; mainly in Budapest, but in other “university hubs” too, like Pécs, Kecskemét, and Debrecen. Health care coverage for these students was provided for by the Ministry of Health based on the Council of Ministers’ decision because they did not have health insurance. We see



further reference in this regard in the detailed report of the Scientific and Higher Education Council titled “On the situation of education and training of professionals abroad and training of foreigners in Hungary,” which can also be considered a result of Kállai’s African tour (MNL8 3410/1963). The document analyses and formulates plans for the training of Hungarian professionals working abroad and integrating foreign professionals into the Hungarian labour market. It urges international framework agreements on the reception of Hungarian professionals abroad and on creating financial resources for this field. The Hungarian government also concluded a trade and technical-scientific agreement with Kenya in 1964 and a cultural and scientific agreement with the Republic of Mali.

The trip to Algeria by Kállai and his delegation had additional benefits: on 1 November 1964, a Hungarian delegation of Hungarian government officials, party and KISZ members viewed the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the start of the Algerian war of liberation.<sup>3</sup> The delegation (in addition to representatives of the local government and economic organisations) met with President Ben Bella, with whom the following issues were discussed according to a report addressed to Béla Biszku, Minister of the Interior from 1957 to 1961 and from 1962 until 1978 Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. Some examples of this political nature: the production of new sculptures in Hungary to Algir’s main square, the training of President Bella’s bodyguards, and the experimental production of Hungarian seeds (MNL9 3446/1964).

Hailé Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, visited Hungary in September 1964. The Hungarian press covered his visit in detail and his speech in Parliament was published in full, which symbolised the importance of the event (Anonymous 1964; Népszabadság 1964: 1; Marsai 2019: 48-66). In May 1965, a Hungarian government delegation travelled to Ethiopia to conclude a technical, scientific, aeronautical, and cultural agreement with the Ethiopian Empire, signed by Seyoum Haregot, acting foreign minister. At this meeting, the sending of Hungarian experts and receiving of Ethiopian scholarship students were discussed. The idea of Hungary building a college of physical education in Ethiopia came up and the Hungarian government offered five million USD in development aid (which eventually did not materialise because of Hungary’s economic limitations).

---

3 KISZ (Hungarian Young Communist League) was a communist youth movement in Hungary founded in 1957 (on the anniversary of the Hungarian Soviet Republic’s declaration in 1919), following the break of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. It claimed to represent all the country’s youth and sought to educate young people politically and to supervise political as well as some social activities for them.

Besides these aspects of political, economic, and scientific life, the dynamic foreign political opening of the 1960s affected numerous other areas as well. The Hungarian Geographical Society, founded in 1872, as well as other exploring, mountain-hiking clubs, all turned towards Northern and Eastern African territories with an ever increasing interest and stood as beneficiaries, or at least were affected in some way by the continuously strengthening African relations. The Budapest Zoo and Botanical Garden also gained an opportunity to enhance its African connections, with this venue frequently incorporated into the African delegations' visits to Budapest. The acquisition of several animals became a reality during this time (i.e., hippos, lions). In addition, African students attending the Gödöllő University of Agrarian Science (Gödöllői Agrártudományi Egyetem) frequently completed their research projects in the Budapest Zoo, later writing their theses related to the fauna of their home countries. A special highlight deserving yet another mention is that the Hungarian Airlines (MALÉV) launched flights into African capitals. For MALÉV, the debut of these flights to African countries was made possible by the Ilyushin Il-18-type aeroplanes that began operating in 1960, as these finally possessed the sufficient range (4800 as well as 6500 km). Initially, however, this only covered North-African destinations. Besides the scheduled flights, MALÉV's aeroplanes also carried a significant freight trade into specific African states, bearing primarily agricultural products such as livestock (chicken hatchlings, pullets, sheep). The first Hungarian aeroplane to pass through the Equator (Type Il-18, registration mark: HA-MOH) completed a government flight on 11 February 1966, on the Budapest to Addis Ababa to Nairobi route. Together with economic and cultural cooperation agreements, aeronautical accords had earlier on been signed with sub-Saharan countries, such as the Hungary-Egypt Treaty on 20 March 1958 and the Hungary-Ghana Agreement on 23 October 1961. Following this, nine more aeronautical accords were sealed with sub-Saharan countries until the 1970s.

### **Kállai's 1966 Africa Tour**

In order to further strengthen relations with Africa, a proposal for sending a new government delegation was again made in 1966. Following a decision of Foreign Minister János Péter (a Reformed Bishop), the Hungarian government once again instructed Gyula Kállai to lead a delegation to conclude negotiations in the United Arab Republic, the Ethiopian Empire, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kuwait, India, and Cyprus. As was typical

for this era, the Hungarian press reported on the tour with a strong interest in foreign policy.<sup>4</sup> The Hungarian delegation's first stop was in the United Arab Republic, where they met with Prime Minister Zakaria Mohieddin and President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Their speeches were published in full by the Hungarian press, and mostly contained the political messages of the time about moral support for the newly independent African states. A few days later, the delegation had negotiations in Addis Ababa, where the Ethiopian ruler awarded Kállai with the ribbon of the Holy Trinity and his wife with the Queen of Sheba Order. The delegation continued its journey to Tanzania in the company of Julius K. Nyerere. Kállai gave a speech on the anniversary of the Zanzibar Revolution, and bilateral negotiations began. The delegation then travelled to Kuwait and India. Returning from the tour, Kállai submitted a nearly 50–page analytical report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was followed by the government decisions below:

- On continuing political, economic, and cultural activities in the newly liberated countries, further strengthening high-level relations
- On increasing the proportion of financial and scholarship support available to students and professionals
- On establishing a Hungarian- Ethiopian EAEC Joint Economic Committee, and concluding a tourism and an aviation agreement
- On establishing an experimental farm in Ethiopia, providing sports equipment, developing a support-plan for an Ethiopian college of physical education, and supporting the work of the Ethiopian state's folk ensemble
- On setting up a mechanical engineering commission with Tanzania, sending a TESCO delegation to the country, launching a training and exchange program with the University of Dar es Salaam, and concluding an aviation agreement.

In the same year (following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1962), Hungary opened a foreign mission in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and in 1967 concluded a trade agreement with Côte d'Ivoire. In 1968, a Hungarian economic government delegation visited the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Senegal, Cameroon, and Mauritania, where trade agreements were signed (Foreign Policy Yearbook 1968: 87).

---

4    János Kádár personally said goodbye to Kállai at the airport, which was published on the front pages of dailies in 1966.

## **The Tour of Pál Losonczi in 1970**

Pál Losonczi, President of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic, made another African tour in August and September 1970. He met with Gamal Abdel Nasser in the United Arab Republic, Julius K. Nyerere in Tanzania, and Yaafar Numeiry in Sudan. In Sudan, the "Revolutionary Command Council awarded Pál Losonczi with Sudan's highest award, the Order of Merit, for his outstanding achievements in developing relations between the two countries and consolidating friendship between their peoples. Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeri was awarded the first degree of the Order of the Flag of the Hungarian People's Republic decorated with diamonds by the Hungarian Presidential Council" (Magyar Nemzet 1970: 1). An economic cooperation agreement was signed in Budapest in the same year, in which the Hungarian government provided a "ten million dollar long-term loan to the Sudanese government to purchase Hungarian machinery and equipment for the African country's economic development" under a Five-Year Plan (Anonymous 1970c; Világgazdaság 1970: 73).

Losonczi's visit, in which cooperation with African countries was strengthened on a "non-capitalist path," marked the end of the "incubation period" of Hungarian foreign policy before 1963. Hungary was elected as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in the autumn of 1967 and, in the spring of 1968, the Hungarian Prime Minister Jenő Fock made the first Hungarian visit to Western Europe. Hungary's foreign trade intensified: in 1970, as a result of the agreements concluded with Africa, imports reached almost HUF 440 million while exports reached HUF 560 million (Foreign Policy Yearbook 1970).

By 1970, the Hungarian People's Republic had diplomatic relations with a total of 89 countries, 88 at ambassadorial level, with embassies operating in 53 countries, 1 consulate, and five consulate generals. By then, Hungary "maintained trade and economic relations with about 80 developing countries; more than 30 of them located on the African continent. A total of 40 treaties with eighteen countries were in force in 1970" (Anonymous 1970a; Kisalföld 1970: 2). In Africa, Hungary had diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level with 26 countries. The Hungarian Foreign Policy Yearbook launched in 1968 (the "almanac" of Hungarian diplomacy) listed those in detail. The list of cultural agreements of Hungary with African countries included:

- UAR-Hungary Cultural Convention (Cairo, 5 September 1957)
- Guinea-Hungary Cultural Convention (Conakry, 12 January 1960, Gov. Stat. 5/1961)
- Ghana-Hungary Cultural Convention (Accra, 27 April 1961, Gov Stat. 20/1962)
- Dahomey-Hungary Cultural Convention (Budapest, 21 June 21 1962)
- Mali-Hungary Cultural Convention (Bamako, 9 December 1962)
- Algeria-Hungary Cultural and Scientific Convention (Algiers, 25 May 1964)
- Ethiopia-Hungary Cultural Convention (Addis Ababa, 25 May 1965, Gov. Stat. 28/1966)
- Tanzania-Hungary Scientific and Cultural Convention (Dar es Salaam, 15 February 1966, Gov. Stat. 32/1966).

By 1970, Communist Hungary had developed a matured Africa policy – with policy papers, well-prepared diplomats, experienced ambassadors – established, or rather revived primarily by the foreign ministers of that time, János Péter and Frigyes Puja. In his memoir on “Hungarian Foreign Politics,” Puja provided a clear study of the geopolitical concept that was to be realised as a kind of counter-diplomacy in opposition to the foreign diplomacy of capitalistic Western countries. Hungary realised that political relations with African countries would only become strong and mutually acknowledged if coupled with well-established economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation. The Hungarian leaders thoroughly learned this lesson from the experience of delegations returning from Africa – clearly recognising that for the politicians of sub-Saharan countries, merely an ideological aim would not be enough; they would also need concrete, tangible results in order to obtain vital, bilateral relations. The experts of political science and economics of that era – as well as the press – then created the theoretical justification content as a background of this “counter-diplomacy.” Among others, *Népszabadság* (a major left-leaning Hungarian newspaper) and *Külpolitika* (Foreign Affairs, the theoretical-political periodical of the Hungarian Institute for Foreign Affairs) regularly published an interpretation of the Africa Policy as practiced by the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Ministry, and its truly outstanding, gap-filling economic and cultural achievements.

The foundation of the International Technical and Scientific Cooperation and Trading Office (TESCO, established in 1962) signalled the responsibility

to thoroughly coordinate and implement the bilateral technological, educational, and vocational training agreements in the areas of community service, education, healthcare, agriculture, as well as water conservation and management. Transferring knowledge and technology entailed expanding the export activity directed from Hungary towards Africa. For a long time, Africans knew numerous Hungarian products closely: they used the Ikarus and Csepel buses, Medicor medical devices and appliances, and Ganz electrical devices. By the end of the 1970s, Hungarian products became well-known and renowned in the SSA region. Roads, railways, and hospitals were built based on Hungarian engineering expertise, among others in Algeria, Libya, Morocco, but the country's specialists were also present in Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania (Tarrósy 2018: 92-111).

## Conclusion

In our study, we have given an overview of the Hungarian Africa policy in the détente period. Our aim was to present a broad picture of post-1960 Hungarian-African relations, which can serve as a basis for future research and which determined the development of Hungarian-African relations after 1960. From the 1970s the construction of Hungarian foreign policy continued and Africa became a priority strategic area for Hungarian diplomacy. In 1971, Tanzanian Prime Minister Rashidi Mfaume Kawawa visited Hungary and later that year Pál Losonci travelled to Algeria and Guinea. In 1973, Losonci negotiated to strengthen bilateral relations in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone, then in 1975 in Libya and Somalia. The Hungarian Foreign Office's journeys continued and its commitments in Africa deepened in the 1970s and 1980s. By mid-1979, 101 Hungarian professionals worked in nine "Black African" countries, and out of 20 African states, thanks to the state-funded scholarship program, 171 students attended Hungarian academic institutions. Over the course of approximately fifteen years, 268 African students graduated in Hungary, while 315 African students took part in post-graduate training in the country between 1970 and 1978. Even though all this was backed by the political attitudes of the age and the Communist Bloc, the achievements are undeniable: the successive Hungarian governments engaged in open, initiative-filled, and pragmatic foreign policy with the SSA countries.

The direction and content of the era discussed is underdocumented and understudied. The significance of this period does not only demonstrate the rebirth of Hungary's connections with Africa, but also the rebirth of

Hungarian foreign affairs as a whole after 1945. The present research article has presented an in-depth analysis mainly of Hungarian African foreign policy of the 1960s and 1970s. Based on archival sources, it has become clear that Hungary wanted to break out of the Bloc's foreign limitations and, at the same time, boost and enhance its diplomatic connections. As a result of its pragmatic foreign policy, and several highly capable diplomats, Hungary was able to improve trade, and economic and diplomatic relations, with partners in almost every possible country in Africa. From a pragmatic point of view, these relations can remain relevant for the Africa Strategy published by the Hungarian government in April 2019.

### **Sources with anonymous authors from Hungarian daily and weekly papers**

- Anonymous. 1931. *Pesti Napló*. "A modern aranyeső." *Pesti Napló* 82(155): 10.
- Anonymous. 1932. *Pesti Hírlap*. "Ismaili Sedky pasa, Egyiptom miniszterelnöke Budapesten" *Pesti Hírlap* 54(192): 3.
- Anonymous. 1935. *Hungarian online news archive* <<https://filmhiradokonline.hu/watch.php?id=1484>> (3 March 2021)
- Anonymous. 1938. *Pesti Hírlap*. "Díszpáholyban a kormányzó nejével, az egyiptomi anyakirályné négy leányával." *Pesti Hírlap* 60(199): 16.
- Anonymous. 1953. *Délmagyarország*, Hungarian daily newspaper. "A jelenlegi nemzetközi helyzetről." 9(121), 26 May, pp. 1–2.
- Anonymous. 1956. *Magyar Nemzet*. "A magyar–szudáni kereskedelmi kapcsolatok kiszélesítéséről beszélt a szudáni kereskedelmi miniszter Budapesten" *Magyar Nemzet* 12(120): 2.
- Anonymous. 1957a. *Esti Hírlap*, Hungarian daily newspaper. "Kairo kormányzója a Fővárosi Tanácsnál." 11(252): 1.
- Anonymous. 1957b. *Esti Hírlap*. "Hárommillió pingpong-labdát vásárol Egyiptom." 2(107): 5.
- Anonymous. 1957c. *Esti Hírlap*. "Újfajta Duna–tengerjáró magyar hajókat építenek." 2(230): 1.
- Anonymous. 1957d. *Esti Hírlap*. "Kokszfűtéses kazánokat gyártattak egyiptomi megrendelésre." 2(259): 22.



- Anonymous. 1957e. *Esti Hírlap*. “Vágóállatokat vásárolt Egyiptom.” 2(279): 144.
- Anonymous. 1958. *Esti Hírlap*. “A Magyar Népköztársaság elismerte a Szudáni Köztársaságot.” 5(4): 1.
- Anonymous. 1964. *Népszabadság*. “I. Hailé Szelasszié császár Budapesten,” 22(222): 1.
- Anonymous. 1965. *Magyar Nemzet*. “Hegedűs András távirata a Szudáni Köztársaság miniszterelnökéhez.” *Magyar Nemzet* 12(4): 1.
- Anonymous. 1966. *Népszabadság*. “János Kádár personally said goodbye to Kállai at the airport, which was published on the front pages of dailies.” *Kállai Gyula megkezdte afrikai és ázsiai körútját* 24(27): 1.
- Anonymous. 1967. “A párt IX. kongresszusa után.” *Magyar Tudomány* 74(1), p. 3.
- Anonymous. 1970a. *Kisalföld*, Hungarian daily paper. “Hazánk gazdasági kapcsolatai az afrikai országokkal,” 15(193): 2.
- Anonymous. 1970b. *Magyar Nemzet*. “Losonczy Pál Tanzániában.” *Magyar Nemzet* 26(198): 1.
- Anonymous. 1970c. “Magyar-szudáni gazdasági kereskedelmi megállapodás.” *Világgazdaság* 118: 73.

### **National Archives of Hungary (MNL)**

- MNL1 OL XIX-A-83-b (3241/1956).
- MNL2 OL XIX-A-83-b (3115/1957).
- MNL3 OL XIX-A-83-b (3175/1957).
- MNL4 OL XIX-A-83-b (3200/1957).
- MNL5 OL XIX-A-83-b (3002/1956).
- MNL6 OL XIX-A-83-b, (3177/1962).
- MNL7 OL XIX-A-83-b, (3340/1962).
- MNL8 OL XIX-A-83-b, (3410/1963).
- MNL9 OL XIX-A-83-b, (3446/1964).

## Republic of Hungary – Official gazettes and other official sources

- Republic of Hungary. 1928. *Budapesti Közlöny* (Official Gazette of Budapest). “A Magyarország és Egyiptom közötti kereskedelempolitikai viszony rendezése tárgyában létrejött megállapodás életbeléptetéséről.” *Budapesti Közlöny* 56( 1).
- Republic of Hungary. 1968. *Foreign Policy Yearbook* (Magyar Külpolitikai Évkönyv) (Budapest), 87.
- Republic of Hungary, *Foreign Policy Yearbook* (Magyar Külpolitikai Évkönyv), 1970.
- Republic of Hungary, *Külügyi Közlöny* (Official Gazette of the Foreign Office) (Budapest, 1921 and 1922), “Announcements and Appointments,” 1.
- Republic of Hungary, *Külügyi Közlöny*, “Az alexandriai tiszteletbeli m. kir. főkonzulátus felállítása,” (Budapest, 1924), 4., 3.
- Republic of Hungary, *Külügyi Közlöny*, “Kairoban m. kir. követség felállítása,” (Budapest, 1928), 5.
- Republic of Hungary, *The Official Gazette of Hungary*, “A Népköztársaság Elnöki Tanácsának 1957. évi 1–5. számú határozata a Magyar Népköztársaság kairói követségének nagykövetségi rangra való emeléséről,” (Budapest, 1957), 66, pp. 389.

## References

- Abdel-Salam Mohamed, Abdallah. 2014. *Az egyiptomi-magyar kapcsolatok a két világháború közötti időszakban*. PhD thesis, University of Szeged <<http://doktori.bibl.u-szeged.hu/id/eprint/2188/>>
- Balogh, Sándor. 1982. *A népi demokratikus Magyarország külpolitikája 1945–1947*. Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó
- Békés, Csaba. 2011. “Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Bipolar World, 1945–1991.” *Foreign Policy Review* 8(1): 65–97.
- Békés, Csaba. 2019. “Enyhülés és emancipáció, Magyarország, a szovjet blokk és a nemzetközi politika 1944–1991.” Budapest: Osiris Kiadó-MTA TK, 11.
- Békés, Csaba. 2022. *Hungary’s Cold War: International Relations from the End of World War II to the Fall of the Soviet Union*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, pp. 259–274.

- Békés, Csaba, J. Nagy, László and Vékony, Dániel (eds.) 2015. *Bittersweet Friendships: Relations between Hungary and the Middle East, 1953–1988*. Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, E-dossier No. 67. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bittersweet-friendships-relations-between-hungary-and-the-middle-east-1953-1988>
- Bencsik, Péter. 2002. “Útiokmányok, utazási lehetőségek és határforgalom a 20. századi Magyarországon.” *Regio* 13(2): 31–50.
- Borhi, László. 2004. *Hungary in the Cold War 1945–1956: Between the United States and the Soviet Union*. Budapest/New York: CEU Press.
- Carr, Edward H. 1939. *The Twenty-Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939*. London: Macmillan.
- Fage, John D. and Tordoff, William. 2002. *A History of Africa*. London/New York: Routledge
- Győri Szabó, Róbert. 2011. *A Magyar külpolitika története 1848-tól napjainkig*. Budapest: Helikon.
- J. Nagy, László. 2015. “Magyar–egyiptomi kapcsolatok a második világháború után (1947–1955).” *Belvedere Meridionale* 27(3): 15–22.
- J. Nagy, László. 2017a. “Birodalmak válsága: Szuezi–Budapest 1956.” In Újvári, Gábor (ed.) *A szuezi válság és Magyarország 1956*. Budapest: Veritas.
- J. Nagy, László. 2017b. “Magyarország és az arab világ 1947–1989.” *Világtörténet* 9(41): 341.
- Kecskés, D. Gusztáv. 2018. “Brüsszelből tekintve: Titkos NATO-jelentések az átalakuló Kelet-Európáról, 1988–1991.” Budapest: Rendszerváltás Történetét Kutató Intézet és Archívum, MTA BTK, p. 261.
- Király, Béla. 2006. “A kortárs történész vallomása: a magyar kérdés az ENSZ-ben, 1956–1963.” In Békés, Csaba and Kecskés, Gusztáv (eds.) *A forradalom és a magyar kérdés az ENSZ-ben, 1956–1963: Tanulmányok, dokumentumok és kronológia*. Budapest: Magyar ENSZ Társaság.
- Komár, Krisztián. 2003. “Hungarian–Egyptian Interwar Relations.” *Mediterrán tanulmányok*, 12: 75–83.
- Kőváriné, Ignáth Éva. 2010. “Az 1969-es magyar nyilatkozat helye az enyhülés időszakában,” *Külügyi Szemle* 9(2): 200.

- Marsai, Viktor. 2019. "A magyar-etióp diplomáciai kapcsolatok felvétele." *Külgügyi Szemle* 18(4): 48–66.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2019. *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Morgenthau, Hans. 2013. "The Balance of Power, valamint Stephen M. Walt: Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." In Scott P. Handler (ed.) *International Politics: Classic and Contemporary Readings*. Los Angeles/New York: Sage, pp. 198–210.
- Patman, Robert G. 1990. *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Puja, Frigyes. 1981. *Magyar külpolitika*. Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó.
- Réti, Balázs. 2019. "A kairói magyar királyi követség (1939–1941)." *Külpolitika* 18(2): 123–140. \*NB This reference was not cited in the text
- Solymári, Dániel. 2023. "Hungary's Pragmatic Diplomacy in the Age of Détente: The Case of the African Opening between 1956 and 1970." *Politics in Central Europe* 19(2): 283–303.
- Szélinger, Balázs. 2002. "Idegen és mégis magyar. A magyar Fiume története (1776–1914)." *Limes* 5: 29–45.
- Tarrósy, István. 2018. "Hungarian Foreign Policy towards Africa during Communism and in the Post-Soviet Era." *Twentieth Century Communism* 15: 92–111.
- Vámos, Péter. 2017. "Baráti segítség és önerőre támaszkodás. Magyar geofizikus expedíció Kínában, 1956–1962." *Történelmi Szemle* 59(1): 47–75.
- Yordanov, Radoslav A. 2016. *The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War*. Lanham/New York: Lexington Books.
- Waltz, Kenneth. 1995. "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory." In Kegley, Charles W. Jr. (ed.) *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 67–83.