Cognitive contrarevolution?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26806/fd.v4i1.76Keywords:
mysl, behaviorismus, kognitivní revoluceAbstract
Standard accounts of the modern history of the study of mind in the twentieth century tell us that while around the half of the century the study came to be dominated by inept behaviorism, the sixties witnessed the onslaught of the "cognitive revolution", which wiped out the dominance of behaviorism and opened the way for the truly unprejudiced and adequate study of mind. In this text I want to reconsider this account and challenge it: in particular, I want to point out that behaviorism was not in all respects so inept as it may suggest; and that the "cognitive revolution" did not mean merely breaking out of inadequate methodological fetters, but rather also an opening of space for what I will call the "magical theory of mind" and what I think belongs neither to science, nor to reasonable philosophy.
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