The concept of incommensurability in social sciences. Cultural relativism and the idea of incommensurability

Authors

  • Martin Paleček KFSV FF UHK, Česká republika

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26806/fd.v3i2.56

Abstract

Some social scientists share the ideology of cultural relativism. This is not to say that they overly subscribe to it, the commitment to it is rather implicit to their attitudes. That is, if we take a closer look at the works of many sociologists, anthropologists and historians, we can clearly discern relativistic patterns. They also share the idea that their approach, involving the relativism, has strong empirical foundations – despite objections of many philosophers. In my article, I am going to explain the motivation for such a cultural relativism. I will claim that that the key underlying idea is that of a certain kind of incommensurability. That is mean that the idea of relativism stay and fall with the idea of incommensurability.

I will discuss whether the Davidsonian approach to relativism via the problem of translability is viable. I will claim that without the possible existence of two distinct conceptual schemes or two distinct languages associated with them there is simply no issue of incommensurablity. I will also claim that most of the socalled empirical proofs of cultural relativism are based on conceptual or methodological confusions.

Author Biography

Martin Paleček, KFSV FF UHK, Česká republika

Martin Paleček je vedoucím Katedry filozofie a spol. věd na filozofické fakultě Univerzity Hradec Králové. Věnuje se převážně filozofii společenských věd a analytické filozofii. 

Published

2011-12-16

Issue

Section

Articles