Explanandum of the theory of consciousness: no consensus in sight?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26806/fd.v9i2.260Abstract
The text critically assesses the claims about phenomenal consciousness contained in the sixth chapter of Tomáš Hříbek’s book What Is it Like, or What Is it about? My starting point is Eric Schwitzgebel’s thesis that we can define phenomenal consciousness in such a neutral and minimalistic way that it’s existence can be
accepted by theoreticians of consciousness of very different stripes. Hříbek does not share this conviction but I try to show that his reasoning is flawed. Considerable attention is devoted to Daniel Dennett’s views on the nature of consciousness, especially to “illusionism” as a theory of consciousness. I regard it as a theory with very unclear content, and suggest that philosophers of consciousness discuss its pros and cons extensively.
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