Hříbek and residua of traditional philosophy of mind
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26806/fd.v9i2.258Abstract
I discuss the starting points of Tomáš Hříbek’s Jaké to je, nebo o čem to je? My aim is to show that despite Hříbek‘s appreciation for Dennett’s postmetaphysical position we can find residua of more traditional philosophical approaches to consciousness in Hříbek’s account. I focus on Hříbek’s definition of the physical
and on the way in which he characterizes Dennett’s program as a problematic reduction of consciousness to intentionality.
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