Je to o fenomenálním charakteru

Abstract

Tomáš Hříbek‘s arguments against the phenomenal character are based mainly on Dennett‘s beliefs. Dennett‘s long-preferred strategy in dealing with this problem is methodological naturalism. This approach has certainly bore its fruits, especially when it comes to opening a really critical debate on the issue of qualia.
The problem of consciousness is, however, nowadays treated rather within materialistic metaphysics than within Dennett‘s methodological naturalism. This preference has both empirical and philosophical reasons which we considered with Tomáš Marvan in the book Vědomí a jeho teorie. In view of the fact that Hříbek‘s monograph responds to some of the opinions from our book, I comment on these reactions and clarify our attitudes. At the same time, I make remarks to Hříbek‘s classification of our position within materialistic metaphysics as type-B materialism. The second part of the paper deals with the phenomenal nature of
conscious experience, and attempts to argue that this hard problem cannot be overcome simply by demonstrating the unsustainability of the traditional understanding of qualia.