Do vague objects imply vague identity?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26806/fd.v10i1.280Abstract
The paper in the field of analytic metaphysics focuses on a problem whether vague objects imply vague (indeterminate) identity. If this be so, one can argue with Evans that such objects cannot exist because vague identity leads to incoherence. The study presents an argument for such an implication (Weathersonian argument) and shows how to evade its conclusion. Evans’ argument presupposes that names in indeterminate identity claims refer determinately. Hence the best way to evade the problem as a whole is to show that vague objects do imply vague (indeterminate) identity, but in such statements of identity, there appear expressions not referring determinately. By this we also solve the objection that the assertion of identity between a vague object and its precise realization is not indeterminate, but what is indeterminate is the identity statement concerning two vague objects.
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