Reflexivity and propositional attitudes

Abstract

The theory of direct reference leads to some problematic consequences about propositional attitudes. One paradoxical consequence is shown on the example of Lois Lane. Given her belief that Superman is stronger than Clark Kent, we are apparently forced to deduce that she also believes that there is someone with a property that he is stronger than he actually is. No rational being would commit to the belief that there is someone with this impossible property. The deduction is based on the notion of reflexivity. This paper explores solutions of how reflexivity is obtained within semantic content and how the paradox can be resolved. First two contemporary options are analyzed: Reflexivity is either a semantic property of relations or that of anaphorical pronouns. Both options are refuted on the basis that reflexivity cannot be part of semantic information in sentences describing relations between the contents of two coreferential singular terms because knowledge about identity of reference is not a condition of semantic competence.
Afterwards a solution is presented according to which reflexivity is only part of the pragmatic content. In the given examples, reflexivity can only be obtained with speakers coordinating their shared knowledge.