Agent Causation in the Light of Compatibilist Criticism

Abstract

The paper is a summary reply to selected points and objections raised in four texts which argue against some aspects of Dvořák’s book Agent Causation (Togga 2020). In relation to the paper by J. Peregrin it explains why it is not possible to accept his solution to the antinomy of free choice and determinism which would be based on the separation of two types of languages or explanatory frameworks. The criticism by S. Sousedík is regarded as based on too narrow a conception of power. The paper rejects that the concept of power implies that only external agents distinct from the bearer of the power could determine its acts. As for the objection raised by D. Peroutka, most of its critical force is accepted by Dvořák who further qualifies to what extent the existence of alternative possibilities is a necessary condition of the free nature of choice. Finally, in the critical discussion with V. Punčochář, Dvořák attempts to explain in what sense chance is contrary to freedom and in what sense it is not. Furthermore, the author does not consider epistemic possibilities to be sufficient for a real freedom of choice.