How it is possible to have free choice in a deterministic world
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26806/fd.v13i1.325Abstract
In this paper I argue against Dvořák’s non-deterministic conception of free will developed in his recent book Agent Causation. In particular, I address Dvořák’s solution of the problem of randomness, according to which the act of free will is random insofar that it is not governed by deterministic laws, and to this extent it cannot be an object of moral evaluation. I put forward my own conception of free will which contrasts to Dvořák’s views and which can be seen as a version of what Dvořák calls the “standard theory”. From this point of view, free will is possible in a deterministic world. I further analyze what a choice among alternative possibilities consists in and I argue that one can have control over one’s actions even if one does not have control over the past which causally determines these actions. I also explain why I believe – in sharp contrast to Dvořák’s conception – that a person can be responsible for her actions even if the world is deterministic.
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