Causality and self-determination?
A critical remark to P. Dvořák’s book Agent Causation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26806/fd.v13i1.322Abstract
Peter Dvořák defends in his book Agent Causation the libertarian approach to the liberty of human will. He considers the will of man to be a capacity, and its freedom the possibility of its self-determination. The author of present contribution criticizes Dvořakʼs theses: He argues a “self-determining capacity” to be a contradictio in terminis. According to his opinion the will can only be self-determining, if it is not a capacity. Only God (if he exists) can have such a will. The author adds a historical remark that a famous exponent of the (as he means) error mistaking the human for the divine will is the sexteenth century theologian Luis Molina; among whose prominent followers we can find René Descartes, too.
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