Fear of losing personal agency and the absence of a moral agent in autonomous transportation vehicles

Abstract

Discussion about philosophical problems associated with the rise of autonomous driving is often associated with negatives and is conducted in the spirit of techno-pessimism. A significant space in this debate is dedicated to the application of the “trolley problem” to vehicle control algorithms. However, in this essay, we reflect on another problem of our moral intuitions – the question of moral agency. The feeling of moral responsibility demands factual control over the situation and causal responsibility. The former driver, now a passenger in an autonomous vehicle, loses this control, but may still experience guilt. Primarily, we should focus on the moral psychology of the user rather than searching for collision optima for algorithms. In the essay, we point out historical parallels of the absence of agency in automated systems and the fact that people are more accepting of autonomous freight transportation than personal transportation. Furthermore, we outline possible ways to shift responsibility, starting with an analogy to a driver losing agency when entering public transportation. A possible operator of autonomous vehicles, overseeing the operation instead of a real driver, could serve as a temporary solution. However, a fictional moral agent appointed by the vehicle operator could potentially become a genuine alternative to moral responsibility. Detachment from ownership of an autonomous vehicle frees individuals from a final perception of moral responsibility, so short-term rentals, sharing, or public transportation could be suitable responses to this psychological phenomenon.

Key words: agency, autonomous vehicles, moral responsibility, moral intuitions