Developing a Sounder Philosophical Foundation for Revolution Studies

Abstract

This article seeks to challenge the standard assumption of Revolution Studies that the occurrence and course of political revolutions can in principle be understood as conforming to scientific law. It develops a critique of the scientific ambitions of the study of revolutions. It does this by examining the successes and failures of theories of revolution, including Marxism, and theories of the so-called first to fourth generations of Revolution Studies, in explaining real-world revolutionary events. The empirical failures of Revolution Studies lead to a more fundamental questioning of the possibility of applying a framework from the hard sciences to complex social phenomena. This is based on the philosophical critiques of using the methodology of the hard sciences to study social phenomena. It draws on the work of Karl Popper, Friedrich Hayek, Michael Strevens, and others. Ultimately, it argues that it is unlikely that we will ever be able to formulate meaningful scientific laws of revolution. Hence the only thing we can do about revolutions in a strictly scientific manner is to collect empirical observations about them. This would, however, result in dry lists of empirical observations that would be unlikely to satisfy the two main reasons why revolution studies exist, which are simply satisfying curiosity about revolutions and informing practical decisions. In order to satisfy curiosity and inform practical decisions, this article argues for the introduction of elements from the art of rhetoric into the study of revolutions. In other words, revolution studies must construct appealing, though not strictly scientific narratives, to give readers the illusion that their questions about revolutions have been answered.

Keywords: Revolutions, Revolution Studies, Philosophy of Social Science, Rhetoric