The Problem with free will arguments based on first-person data

Abstract

In this article I claim that in creating our socio-political institutions we should not account for or be concerned with our everyday feeling of free will. In the first part I quickly characterize the free will problem. Then I move on to the description of what I call first person arguments for free will. In the second section, I show the way in which the free will problem affects our everyday wellbeing. Because of this, I claim further on, we ought to want a height epistemic standard for arguments for or against free will. By that I mean the need for said arguments to be indubitable rather than doubtful. In last section of this article, I show that first person arguments are indeed doubtful. This is done, mainly, by drawing on neuroscientific findings. From this I conclude that we ought not to take into account our experience of free will when we are formulating or justifying our socio-political enterprises (e.g. justification of punishment). My conclusion is, therefore, that we ought to ignore or mostly ignore first person arguments for free will.